I
nvasive exotic or alien species cause enormous damage to the natural environment. Indeed, 49% of all imperiled species in the United States are threatened in part by alien species (Wilcove et al. 1998) . The toll may be even higher: Additional plant species have been harmed by alien species but have not yet been designated as imperiled (e.g., the American chestnut, Fraser fir, American elm, flowering dogwood). Losses in the agriculture, forestry, and other sectors of the US economy and control costs associated with invasive alien species total $137 billion annually. Approximately $80 billion of that amount is associated with alien plants, insects, and disease pathogens subject to phytosanitary regulations (Pimentel et al. 1999) , which are the subject of this article.
Because attempts to eradicate established invasive alien species have met with little success, scientists recommend that governments put the highest priority on preventing introduction of such species. This article examines US policies governing the structure and implementation of prevention programs aimed at alien plants and those insects and disease pathogens considered to be plant pests.
The role of international trade
Whereas many invasive plants have been imported deliberately, insects and fungal pathogens usually hitch a ride with imported cargo. As Chris Bright noted during a presentation at the Worldwatch Institute on 8 October 1998, international trade "leaks" exotic species. Many others also have predicted that severe damage would follow introduction of insects and fungal pathogens from forests in Europe, Mexico, Asia, or other regions that trade heavily with the United States (Forest Service 1991 , 1998 , Campbell and Schlarbaum 1994 , Niemela and Mattson 1996 , APHIS 1998c ,1998d .
Some types of imports are particularly likely to transport hitchhikers. Live plants imported for horticultural use, for example, have been called a "uniquely efficient pest introduction pathway" (Regelbrugge 1998) . Between 45% and 86% of various categories of pests introduced to California in recent decades came in on horticultural imports (OTA 1993) . Among forest pests that were most likely introduced on imported live plants are dogwood anthracnose (Discula destructiva Redlin) (Campbell and Schlarbaum1994) , Melampsora fungus on larch and poplar, and pine pitch canker (Fusarium subglutinans f. sp. pini) on Monterrey pine (Pinus radiata) (Haleamau 1998) .
Like live plants, "green" wood-raw or unprocessed wood-is a high-risk import. Crates, pallets, spools for cable, and other packaging are often made from low-quality, pest-damaged wood. When not in use, these items are usually piled in the open air, thus facilitating pests' establishment (APHIS 1998d) . As US imports have grown-by more than 50% just since 1990 (GAO 1997 )-so too has the quantity of solid wood packaging in which they are shipped, thus
Faith Thompson Campbell (e-mail: phytodoer@aol.com Another wood pathway for pests is through imported logs, unprocessed lumber, and wood chips. Those US imports once came almost exclusively from Canada, which is a lowrisk source because forests in these two nations are contiguous. However, beginning in the 1990s, US wood processors have imported increasing quantities of green wood from geographically separate areas that harbor pests inimical to US forests. Although Canada still supplies more than 70% of US wood imports, Mexico supplies more than 3%, China more than 2%, Chile nearly 2%, and New Zealand about 0.6%; the remainder comes from tropical countries. These imports are expected to increase in the future now that a court injunction limiting imports has been lifted.
Some knowledgeable observers, including scientists working with horticultural and forest pests (La Fage and Williams 1979, Niemela and Mattson 1996) , as well as the National Plant Board (National Plant Board 1999), have concluded that the phytosanitary safeguards set out by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) are inadequate to prevent introductions at current trade levels. According to the National Plant Board, "Recent breaches of the APHIS-PPQ [Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Plant Protection and Quarantine] safeguarding system that led to entry of dangerous invasive plant pests in the U.S. have raised concerns that current organizational policies and procedures are inadequate to execute Agency functions.... Clearly, the current safeguarding system cannot meet the changes thrust upon it by rapidly transforming global circumstances" (National Plant Board 1999, p. 40 ).
Yet with imports rising, the danger of alien organisms reaching America is increasing, and phytosanitary controls would have to be tightened commensurately to ensure the same level of protection. APHIS has begun to strengthen its regulations for wood packing (APHIS 1998e,1999a and lumber from Mexico (APHIS 1999b) ; both of these rulemakings are still in process. Nonetheless, it has fought in court against scientists who argue that regulations should be strengthened also for logs and lumber from New Zealand and Chile; it has rejected similar pleas from the Oregon Department of Agriculture for regulation strengthening. Moreover, the USDA has relaxed controls for certain horticultural imports.
An ideal program
To be "science based," a phytosanitary program should reflect the serious threat posed by exotic species to agriculture, horticulture, and forestry, and to the myriad natural ecosystems and biotic communities found from Alaska to Florida and from Maine to Hawaii. It should also reflect practical realities.
First, ecologists realize that their knowledge of the millions of insects, fungi, and disease pathogens living in the habitats of US trading partners is limited. Indeed, probably less than 5% of the Earth's fungi have even been named by science; fewer still have been studied enough to determine their ecological role. Scientists know more about exotic insects and plants, but even among these groups are tens of thousands of species that have not been well studied. Given these large information gaps, it may well be impossible for scientists to predict which foreign species might cause devastating damage if introduced to a new ecosystem.
Second, biological invasions are usually irreversible, given current scientific knowledge, limited funding, and burgeoning pest problems. In other words, it is far easierand less expensive-to prevent an invasion than to combat one.
It follows that a sound phytosanitary program should seek to bar entry to all exotic organisms except those that have been evaluated and determined to be very unlikely to be invasive. Two slogans express this goal: "If in doubt, keep it out" and "Guilty until proven innocent."
To put this objective into practice, the responsible government agency-USDA's APHIS-could combine technological treatments with stringent regulatory requirements that importers act to minimize the likelihood that living, unapproved insects, fungal pathogens, viruses, or weeds will hitchhike to this country on imported goods. This approach obviates several problems. First, it reduces the burden on port inspectors, who would otherwise have to search millions of shipments for tiny, even microscopic, organisms. Second, it reduces the risk that an erroneous assessment of the potential impacts of an organism will result in a decision to allow entry of a species that turns out to be highly damaging. An appropriately serious phytosanitary program should also seek out and utilize all available and emerging information on pests, pathways, and exclusion or mitigation technologies, and rapidly adapt regulations to reflect that new information.
However, USDA officials have rejected the "If in doubt, keep it out" policy (Isi Siddiqui [US Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture], personal communication, 1998), finding it incompatible with trade promotion; APHIS is now trying to "balance" protection and trade promotion. Thus, rising trade volume is not the sole reason that the threat of introduction of harmful bioinvaders is growing.
Although USDA policy that proves ineffective can be changed through domestic political channels, pro-trade policies now have the force of international law through US adherence to global trade rules enforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) . Thus, if these policies do result in too high a risk of introduction of pests, international treaties adopted by 135 countries must be changed-a daunting challenge.
Requirements of the SPS agreement and IPPC
Phytosanitary measures are no longer adopted unilaterally in response to a country's perception of risk. Phytosanitary safeguards are now subject to international standards and review.
In 1994 more than 100 countries concluded the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade by forming the World Trade Organization, which sets the rules for international trade. To prevent member nations from using phytosanitary safeguards to protect domestic agricultural producers from foreign competition, the signatories simultaneously adopted the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement; see www.wto.org). In November 1997, the 46-year-old International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), which was formed to control plant pests and diseases and prevent their spread across national borders, was revised to bring it into compliance with the SPS agreement. (The  IPPC revisions have not yet come into force, however, because too few nations have ratified the changes.)
Under the SPS agreement and revised IPPC, countries may impose trade restrictions to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant health-including wild fauna and flora-as long as they apply the same standards for protection across the board, domestically as well as internationally. Phytosanitary measures must be based on scientific principles and supported by scientific evidence, as documented in a risk assessment. When scientific information is insufficient to meet the requirements for risk assessment laid out in the SPS agreement, a country may adopt a provisional regulation while seeking more information.
Taking into account available scientific evidence, the risk assessment should address processing or production methods; inspection and sampling methods; prevalence of the target organism-or the existence of pest-or disease-free areas-in the exporting and importing countries; ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or treatment measures that could control any pest that is introduced. A risk assessment should also take into consideration the potential damages from introduction of a pest or disease (such as losses in production or sales and the cost of control or eradication) and the cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks.
The SPS agreement states that phytosanitary regulations should not be more restrictive than necessary to achieve a country's chosen level of protection-which could be set at zero risk-and that the process of their promulgation must be transparent. Finally, the SPS agreement grants developing countries more time to comply with international phytosanitary standards and calls on WTO member countries to give them technical assistance.
Countries that believe their exports have been discriminated against may challenge the importing country's phytosanitary protections as nontariff barriers to trade; if the challenger wins its case, the importer must either revise the phytosanitary regulations or pay a penalty. The penalty can be substantial: For example, after the European Communities (EC) refused to accept a WTO Appellate Body ruling allowing entry of US beef from cattle treated with growth hormones, the United States imposed a $116.8 million tariff on various European food exports (Williams 1999 ).
Problems arising from the SPS agreement
The SPS agreement is only now being interpreted-often through official decisions of WTO dispute settlement bodies-thus many questions remain to be answered about what the agreement allows. USDA is wrestling also with questions about how it will apply certain provisions. For example, what level of protection should the United States strive to maintain? Which agencies, in addition to APHIS, should weigh in on this policy? Because any pests introduced as a result of APHIS policies will affect everyone in the United States, as well as the environment, all of the issues surrounding the SPS agreement should be the subject of broad discussion. Two topics in particular-determination of an appropriate level of protection and "quarantine pests"-should be part of that discussion.
Appropriate level of protection. As mentioned above, each country has the right to set its own level of protection, even if that level is zero risk. However, a country must consistently apply comparable levels of protection in comparable situations; a further limitation to this right to determine an appropriate level of protection, according to the WTO Appellate Body, is that the country is obligated to demonstrate a scientific justification for the selected level of risk (Victor 1999) .
The consistency requirement exposes any phytosanitary safeguard to comparison with other domestic or international statutes aimed at managing a comparable risk orimportantly-to comparison with the absence of such statutes. A gap in the protection provided by these statutes could be cited as proof that a stringent phytosanitary regulation is inconsistent with existing standards. Indeed, the Appellate Body ruled against Australia when that country banned imports of salmon largely because the sanitary measure for salmon imports was more stringent than that for other fish imports judged-by the WTO dispute panel-to pose an equal or greater risk (WTO AB-1998-5) .
For stringent phytosanitary safeguards to survive a challenge under the SPS agreement, then, countries must close any loopholes in regulations governing comparable situations. Of course, tightening these statutes takes time and may prove difficult because of political pressures. Until these steps are taken, however, differences in a country's approach to various risks to health and to the environment might be challenged as "arbitrary or unjustifiable inconsistencies... [which] are to be avoided" (WTO AB-1997-4) .
The SPS dispute bodies have also ruled that a country's determination of its acceptable level of risk be supported by a risk assessment; that assessment must be quite specific, even though scientists have little ability to predict which foreign species may prove damaging when introduced to a new environment. In the EC case regarding meat from hormonetreated US cattle, the dispute panel, supported by the Appellate Body, noted that the scientific studies on which the European Communities based their level of risk were in the nature of general studies; they did not evaluate, as the Appellate Body stated they should, the carcinogenic potential of the hormones at residue levels found "in 'food,' more specifically, 'meat or meat products,'" when the hormones are "used specifically for growth promotion purposes" [italics in original] (WTO AB-1997-4, p. 79) .
Applying this level of specificity to a risk assessment for potential plant pests might mean justifying restrictions on log imports by demonstrating both that a particular fungus has the potential to damage trees in the importing country and that the fungus might be present on an imported log. The risk assessment would probably have to address separately each tree species or genus used to make logs for export.
Furthermore, the Appellate Body decided that "it is not sufficient...that there is a 'possibility' of entry. A proper risk assessment...must evaluate the 'likelihood,' i.e., the probability, of entry, establishment, or spread" (WTO AB-1998-5, p. 74) . Although the Appellate Body imposed strict standards, it did explicitly state that the analysis does not have to be quantitative, nor must it prove that the damage would reach any threshold (WTO AB-1998-5) .
Given current levels of scientific knowledge and funding, can APHIS realistically be expected to evaluate the likelihood or probability that any of the multitude of insects, fungi, or plant propagules-any of which could hitch a ride on any import from any of 134 US trading partners-might invade any of the agricultural or natural ecosystems of the United States? Moreover, the Appellate Body did not acknowledge the probability that many other potential pests cannot be evaluated at all, because they are either unknown to science or inconspicuous or benign in their native environments.
Quarantine pests. Before APHIS can apply phytosanitary safeguards, an organism targeted for control must have been designated a "quarantine pest." That designation must be based on a risk assessment, despite the gaps in data and scientific understanding just described. In practice, for example, APHIS might well be able to predict that certain insects traveling on imports of cut flowers pose a threat to floriculture in Florida. But do agency scientists have sufficient information to judge how those insects might behave in Florida's natural ecosystems? Or to assess the potential for invasion represented by other species of insect or pathogens hitchhiking on the same flower shipments? It is doubtful that APHIS can make these findings.
Furthermore, the time required to prepare risk assessments means that imports of goods known to pose severe pest risks can continue for several years before APHIS can complete the process and impose new regulations. For example, although APHIS announced in May 1998 that it considered solid wood packing material to be one of the greatest pest threats of all wood imports (APHIS 1998a) , it released its risk assessment justifying tighter regulations only in October 2000; APHIS anticipates completing the rule in 2003.
The only way a country can escape the obligation to define the problem and its solution with such specificity is through adoption of provisional measures under the terms of article 5.7. In ruling on the US challenge concerning Japan's regulations on imports of fruits and nuts, the Appellate Body reaffirmed that a measure cannot qualify as provisional unless the country is seeking the missing information and will review the provisional measure within a reasonable period (Victor 1999 ). The repercussion is that, in the many instances in which APHIS operates with incomplete information, it must choose either to allow the organism with unknown invasive potential into the country-and hope it will not prove damaging-or to impose a provisional restriction on its importation and devote scarce resources to trying to fulfill the demanding standards of the SPS agreement.
The best way to compensate for the lack of information on individual species may well be to focus on pathways of introduction. Once it has been determined that pests may be introduced via a certain type of import or conveyance, whatever its country of origin, APHIS should require shippers to use the best available technology to make that commodity or conveyance as inhospitable as possible to insects, fungi, and seeds. Does the SPS agreement allow a country to adopt such an all-encompassing safeguard on the basis of a risk assessment that examines (a) a sample of pests that might be associated with that import and (b) some-but not all-exporting countries? Although pathway regulation has not yet been at issue in a dispute, the emphasis on specificity in the text of the agreement and in Appellate Body interpretations suggests that such an approach would be found unacceptable.
Minimum disruption to trade. Even when an organism has been designated a "quarantine pest," the treaty still requires phytosanitary agencies to ensure that their phytosanitary requirements cause the minimum disruption to trade. In other words, instead of adopting the most effective measure to guard against some pest-known or unknown-slipping through, a country must accept some risk of precisely that event happening and adopt those measures that promise a so-called adequate level of protection. For example, in the case of logs and lumber imported from New Zealand and Chile, APHIS deliberately chose the less effective of alternative measures in order to reduce the burden on importers: APHIS concurred with scientists' comments that heat treatments would be more effective than fumigation with methyl bromide in preventing pest introductions, then justified its choice of fumigation by stating that "APHIS is fully committed to protecting the Nation's agricultural resources and its forest resources from exotic plant pests, but it also has the obligation...to ensure that...mitigation measures...impact international commerce only to the degree needed to meet APHIS' plant protection goal of reducing plant pest risk to a negligible level. To go beyond this protective standard would be considered unfair trade restrictions under GATT and subject to challenge by other trading partners in the World Trade Organization" (APHIS 1998a, p. A-9) .
Preventing new introductions of established pests
The SPS agreement and revised IPPC severely restrict the right of the United States to protect itself from repeated introduction of the thousands of species of pests and weeds that are already damaging natural ecosystems in the country (for insects, see Niemela and Mattson 1996, APHIS 1998a ; for weedy plants, see Kartesz 1999 and the Plant Conservation Alliance Web site at www.nps.gov/plants/alien). Allowing more individual organisms belonging to these species into the country presents several risks: The added numbers enable the species to reproduce rapidly, the new imports may establish a population in an area not previously infested, and the newly imported organisms may introduce a genetic variety that is harder to control than previously established varieties (for examples drawn from the New Zealand experience, see Virtue et al. 1999) .
Nevertheless, the SPS agreement and IPPC allow a country to erect phytosanitary barriers for pests already in the country only when the species is not widespread and an official control program targets the species, or when the newly introduced organism differs genetically from its relative in the United States in a way that demonstrates the potential to cause greater damage. Therefore, determining which governmental entities' efforts qualify as an "official control program" will greatly affect the types and numbers of established pests and weeds against which APHIS can protect US ecosystems from additional imports. Currently, however, federal agencies lack the resources to institute control programs for more than a few dozen species. A larger number of taxa could qualify for phytosanitary controls at US borders, provided that states' regulatory and eradication programs are considered "official control programs." Given the problems that could result from allowing additional introductions of established species, it would be appropriate to involve all stakeholders in deciding the issue of which efforts of governmental entities are to be deemed official control programs.
As noted above, the SPS agreement also allows governments to exclude newly encountered forms of an established pest when the new form differs genetically in significant ways from forms already in the country. However, phytosanitary agencies have been known to make mistakes in their attempts to determine such differences, mistakes that can have serious repercussions. Clive Brasier (2001) describes the spread of virulent forms of Dutch elm disease (caused by several fungi in the Ophiostoma genus), which resulted when phytosanitary agencies allowed imports of diseased elm logs, based on their mistaken belief that the disease had only one form that was already present in their countries.
APHIS policies
Certain APHIS policies and procedures appear to be flawed, which may exacerbate the threat arising from inadequacies of the SPS agreement. For example, according to the National Plant Board,"The APHIS-PPQ risk assessment process does not adequately describe the uncertainty present in the process, nor does it list assumptions on which subjective judgments or models are based. Many aspects of the process are overly simplistic" (National Plant Board 1999) .
In response to this criticism, APHIS has launched a major review of its risk assessment practices. On October 8, 1999, the agency published a notice in the Federal Register seeking comments on the issue, and on 10 November 1999, it held a public hearing. At the public hearing Dr. Edmund Crouch, an expert in conducting risk assessments, outlined his views on a proper process and noted gaps in APHIS procedures. He repeatedly stressed the need for consultations with outside experts throughout the process to ensure that no factor is left out. He also noted that APHIS focuses too much on the probability of an introduction and too little on the possible consequences of such an introduction (Crouch 1999).
APHIS is also organizing a symposium to review and discuss existing international standards and the current state of the art. APHIS plans to hire a scientist charged with keeping abreast of changes in methodology, ensure adequate outreach, and so forth.
Steps to improve phytosanitary regulations
The SPS agreement was written almost 10 years ago by people interested in promoting trade and not well-versed in the new field of invasion ecology. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the SPS agreement restricts phytosanitary safeguards and thereby increases the danger of harmful introductions. The danger arises mainly from
• explicitly granting priority to trade over protection from biological invasion • not fully considering the immense variety of species and receiving biological systems subject to its terms • implicitly focusing efforts on identifying and excluding a few species rather than on preventing any introductions via hazardous pathways • ignoring real-life constraints hindering the management of bioinvasion • ignoring the differences in risk of bioinvasion associated with shipments from foreign, as opposed to domestic, producers By choosing to rely so heavily on risk assessments when the underlying data are insufficient, policymakers exacerbate the peril. A unique opportunity exists for American scientists to consider the issues raised in this article and to press for changes in policies that run counter to effective pest exclusion strategies. In February 2000 former US President Clinton created an Invasive Species Council and charged it with developing recommendations for improving US programs to prevent and respond to bioinvasion. The Invasive Species Council should examine whether the SPS agreement and IPPC allow countries to adopt phytosanitary programs closer to the structure outlined above in "An ideal program."
In the meantime, APHIS can greatly improve its pest exclusion program within the constraints imposed by the SPS agreement and IPPC by adopting zero risk-the goal toward which it should strive-as America's appropriate level of protection. Although this new stance would not fully restore "If in doubt, keep it out" or "Guilty until proven innocent" as the guiding philosophy in making decisions, it would signal the agency's determination to be as proactive as possible when deciding, for example, which organisms should be considered "quarantine pests." As described above, APHIS is already exploring ways to improve its risk assessment procedures.
Risk assessment may be an appropriate methodology for helping to set priorities for search and eradication efforts targeted on known pests, but the process is too slow and too vulnerable to data gaps to constitute a sound, scientific basis for constructing an exclusion program.
